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Each of the EU’s 28 members are wholly sovereign in their own right 
– they merely voluntarily surrender that to certain supranational 
institutions. The ultimate exercise of that sovereignty is the ability to 
withdraw from the Union. Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty sets out the 
appropriate conditions to exercise such a right. In this sense, the 
Union is, indeed, a voluntary arrangement in the same way that other 
modern free trade agreements are. Eagle-eyed readers will note that 
the primacy of national sovereignty is what underpinned the Court of 
Justice’s ruling that Article 50 could be unilaterally revoked. 
In a fundamental sense, this sovereignty remains untrammelled: any 
member state has the ability to leave the EU without conditions. 
However, in order to exercise this sovereignty the state in question 
must sever all ties abruptly and immediately – what has become 
known in popular parlance as a “no-deal” scenario. Doing so would do 
enormous damage both to the country wishing to secede from the EU 
as well as its neighbours. Were Sweden to choose to leave the EU 
with ‘no deal’, Finland, Norway and Denmark would inevitably be 
hugely affected in addition to the huge impact on Sweden itself. 
Of course, all of this can be avoided by agreeing a Withdrawal 
Agreement. This is not about outlining how future relations are to be 
governed but rather about ensuring that key things are decided. 
Failure to agree a Withdrawal Agreement to the satisfaction of the EU 
will result in the severance of ties as specified in the paragraph prior. 
In the case of Brexit, this is complicated by the status of Northern 
Ireland: the Withdrawal Agreement entails a potentially indefinite loss 
of sovereignty over a constituent part of the UK. Although many in 
Great Britain would be only too happy to see Northern Ireland reunited 
with the Republic, viewing it as an anachronism left over from a 
conflict which ended in 1922, the mainland feels politically bound to 
accept the wishes of the majority of the population living there in this 
matter. 
Some analogies are perhaps helpful here. Whatever legitimate 
grievances the FLNC might have in Corsica, it is extremely difficult to 
envisage the French state acquiescing to the island being potentially 
indefinitely bound by a legal system over which they have no 
influence and which is different to that on the mainland. An equivalent 
analogy might be the Basque country in Spain. Would Madrid be 
content if a condition of signing a Withdrawal Agreement were for the 
Basque country to maintain indefinite adherence to the same 
phytosanitary regulations as France, irrespective of what policies are 
decided by the Spanish government? 
Of course, from a game-theoretic perspective the strategy pursued by 
the EU makes complete sense as the following paragraphs illustrate. 
First, note that whatever else they might agree on, both the UK and 
the EU benefit from the absence of tariffs between them. There 
should, therefore, be no barrier whatsoever in agreeing to a ‘vanilla’ 
free trade deal: zero tariffs on goods –whether or not any other 
agreements can be signed. 
Similarly, on 30th March whatever happens the UK and EU will 
continue to share exactly the same sanitary and phytosanitary 
standards, so it would make logical sense to agree reciprocal 
recognition of standards for as long as this continues to be the case. 
Were either party to change their standards in any way then the other 
party would need to choose whether to match that change or if checks 
needed to be imposed. At a stroke this would obviate the need for 
some 70-80% of checks on trade. Once again, both sides benefit from 
this. 
However, the key element here is that the EU (as an institution) 
benefits from the Withdrawal Agreement being agreed. Thus, in order 
to guarantee that this will be agreed by the UK, it is necessary to be 
able to credibly threaten not to implement these mutually beneficial 
measures if the UK is to leave without agreeing it. In game theoretic 
terms, the EU needs to be able to credibly promise to punish the UK if 
it does not cede sovereignty in this manner. I use the term ‘punish’ 
advisedly: it is not an emotional rant, simply a factual statement of 
strategy. The EU thus must promise not to negotiate an FTA (at least 
for a period of time) in the event that the Withdrawal Agreement is not 
ratified. A similar logic applies to mutual recognition of standards. 
After all, a Withdrawal Agreement ensures that certain fundamental 
desires of the EU (above and beyond these) are appropriately met. 
Specifically, it ensures that monies owed by the UK to the EU are 
guaranteed to be paid. The rights of EU citizens living in the UK are 
protected, although it’s almost certain that this would occur anyway. 
Crucially, it also ensures that irrespective of the future actions of the 
UK or EU, the EU would never need or want to inspect (or impose 
customs checks on) goods coming from Northern Ireland. The 
advantages of such an arrangement are twofold: firstly, there can be 
no possibility of goods entering the EU that do not meet the 
requirements of the Single Market and secondly the EU cannot be 
found in breach of WTO rules on preferential trade. Once again, the 
key here is that this would apply irrespective of the future actions of 
either party. 
Yet, this same strategy poses serious questions of the nature of the 
Union. After all, it implies that the exercise of absolute sovereignty 
(leaving the Union) will cause punishment. Yet a non-member would 
be able to negotiate a Free Trade Agreement (bearing in mind that 
CETA, for example, removes some 98% of tariffs and by all accounts 
it was the non-tariff barriers that took time to negotiate). Moreover, the 
removal of tariffs alone is the purview of the Union authorities 
and not those of nation states so there is little reason not to proceed 
extremely quickly. 
This is deeply problematic for a Union of sovereign states. If the EU is 
indeed merely a group of states that have agreed to pool sovereignty, 
then there can be no reason not to engage with a member wishing to 
exercise some part of that sovereignty directly. From the EU’s 
perspective, this punishment is necessary in order to demonstrate that 
leaving the Union entails a cost sufficiently high to discourage others 
from doing the same. 
Two issues are thus raised. Firstly, this approach would make vastly 
more sense were the Union a true federation. Perhaps the obvious 
solution is to stop obfuscating and simply agree that this is where we 
need to be. There is no reason for political authority to be coterminous 
with what groups of people feel their identity to be. One can feel 
German and yet be ruled from Brussels just as one can feel Bavarian 
but be run from Berlin. 
The second major issue is that these actions suggest significant 
ossification of the structures of the Union. We need to be clear about 
this – the value of the EU lies not in what it is or how it is structured 
but what it does. As Europeans, rather than fearing populism we need 
to engage with it. There is no threat to Europe from a prosperous 
Britain lying outside of the Union – far from it. European states do not 
lose from British participation in the European Aviation Safety Agency. 
We do not lose from agreeing to recognise phytosanitary standards 
that are identical, and there is no need for a Withdrawal Agreement to 
do so. Our continent’s troubled history shows that magnanimity is a 
better strategy than punishment. We can use Brexit as an opportunity 
to reinvent the Union in a way that reacts to and addresses the 
concerns of disaffected citizens: not just in the UK but across Europe. 
 
